THE WAR IN SPAIN.

The Battle of Lacar----Special Details of the Famous Spanish Engagement.

TWO KINGS IN THE FIELD.

A Victory for the Carlists With an Army Cut in Two.

THE FLIGHT FROM CARRASCAL

General Serrano Explains His Difficulty.

Don Carlos Takes Command-A Bloody Revenge.

DESPERATION, DISASTER AND DEATH.

A man who, knowing thieves were going to make an attempt upon his house, should lock all the front doors and leave one back door wide open, would be considered a very foolish man indeed. Yet this is just what the Carlists did in fortifying the approaches to Biurrun or Carrascal and leaving unfortified the road from Sanguesa.

CARLIST STRATEGY.

As I have explained in a previous letter, the only object the Carlists had in holding the Tafalla road at Carrascal was to cut the communication with Pampeluna, because they hoped to take the place by starvation. But besides the roads through Carrascal and Puente la Reina, both of which were fortified by the Carlists, there was the one from Sanguesa. This road joins the one from Tafalla, between Carrascal and Pumpeluna, at the village of Noain, about six miles from the latter and three from the former place. Consequently, if the liberal General could pusa a strong force forward as lar as Noain, the formidable positions of Carrascal would be turned and rendered untenable, the Tafalla road opened,

PAMPELUNA RELIEVED, and all the fortifications the Carlists had spent so much time upon rendered useless. It does not seem to have occurred to the Carlist generals that their adversaries, and they did not, therefore, go to the trouble of fortifying the Sanguesa road at all. They relied upon three or four battalions for holding it against any force that would probably be sent in that direction, and, indeed, until within the last few days its defence was intrusted to two or three companies only. Their reasons for supposing the enemy would not make an attempt by this road were, as well as I can make out, that for a distance of several miles it is unfinished, and, therefore, impassable for a convoy or for heavy artillery, besides which, passing through parrow deflies and valleys, it is very easy of defence. Everything considered, they thought THE ROAD THROUGH CARRASCAL.

even with its fortifications, a weaker point, and that the attack for that reason would be made

Tney, therefore, concentrated their forces at Carrascal and Puente, and left only five battalions to defend the Sanguesa road. It does not seem to have occurred to them that although a convoy for the relief of Pampeluna could not pass by this route, if a sufficient force of infantry and mountain artillery, carried on mules, could get through, the result would be the same in torcing them to open the road by which a convoy could pass. And yet such a plan, one would think, should be elementary in strategy. I had never been out on the Sanguesa road, but supposed, as a matter of course, that it, as well as the others, was fortified, until two or three days before the attack, and was greatly astonished to learn that it was not. General Mendiri, one would have supposed, might have thought that just because Carrascal was strongly fortined no attack would her of troops would be sufficient to hold it, fortified as it was, for a day or two. Had he, therefore, gone out the sanguesa road with a large force he might have whipped Moriones and then rascal or Puente, wherever he might in the mean-

returned in time to beat Primo de Rivera at Carrascal or Puente, wherever he might in the meantime have attacked. This, however, would have required better fortifications than the Carlists his deforting at the carlists his description of the continuation of the carlists his description of the carlists his description of the carlists his description of the carlists at layer already explained in a previous letter, were not of the kind, for the most part, to resist an assault, unless beavily manned, owing to the want of olicines before them to stop an assaulting column. And the fruth is that the weakest points in the line—the low hills and open fields between Puente la Reina and Artajona and the low woody mountains of St. Cristobal, between Oteiza and Lorea—were not entrenched at all. The Carlist leaders seem to have been laboring under the delusion that the enemy would only come by the roads—the thief would try to get into the house by the front door in broad davight. They, therefore, did not lortily the positions between the roads, where, for a distance of six or eight miles, inlantry might pass with case. In other words, they locked the doors and left the windows wide open. Had Mendiri therefore met and even whipped Moriones on the Sanguesa road, the probabilities are that Estella would have been taken, or his line cut in two, at least, in his absence. Indeed, this last mentioned evenuality actually occurred, as it was.

THE CARLIST LINE TOO LONG.

The truth is the Carlist line was too long to be defended with any chance of success, and I am not a supposed to quarrei with Mendiri for having been beaten. From Villamayor, on the Los Arcos road (the Carlist right), to Carrascal, on the road to Pampeluma (their left), is a distance of twenty-eight miles, while, if we count the extreme left.

road (the Carlist Fight), to Carrascal, on the road to Pampeluma (their leit), is a distance of wenty-eight miles, while, if we count the extreme left, at Monreal, on the Sanguesa road, ten miles more, the Carlist line was thrity-eight miles long. To defend this enormous distance Menditi had less than 25,000 men, while his enemy had 69,000. The task was impossible.

Of course a Napoleon I., as soon as Moriones had separated from the rest of the army and gone to Sanguesa, would have gathered up 15,000 men and flung them against Primo Rivera's 20,000 forming the centre and crushed it in time to tura around and whip Moriones in his turn. But this would have required a certainty of miormation with regard

the centre and crushed it in time to tura around and whny Moriones in his curn. But thus would have required a certainty or information with regaid to the enemy's movements, an intuitive knowledge of his designs and a promptness of decision only possessed by the great Napoleon. I am even included to their which have a serious and a promptness of decision only possessed by the great Napoleon. I am even included to think, from hints I received before the affair, that Mendiri had some plan analogous to this which he was not enabled to carry out, first, because he did not receive correct information either of the plans or the movements of the enemy, and second, as the sequei will show, because the low, woody mountain of St. Critobal, between Oteiza and Lorca, was not fortified to hold it against a sudden obsiaught. Under the circumstances, therefore, I am not surprised at Mendiri naving lost Carrascal and Phente ia Reina, and do not think, everything considered, that he is to blame except for having englected to forthly the line.

Carklist bragging.

Carlists bragging.

But what I do blame the Carlists for was their unconscionable bragging. For the last six months they have been delying their adversaries to take Carrascal, inviting them to come on, assuring the world it could never be taken, and raising expectations among the people with regard to Pampelina that were not to be realized, as they had done at frun. After all this boasting it turns out that Carrascal was taken without firing a shot. Nothing could be faster, more riorcious or better calculated to discourage the people than such failures. It was, or course, quite right that the Carlists should never have fortified in months; but they should never have fortified in times, indeed, they intended to fortify the whole line to the sanguess road, and, above all, they should not have bragged.

The Carlist his extended from Yillamayor on the los Arcos road, through Dicastido, Oteiza and Mendigorna, to Carrascal or Binarun on the road, about early was besides occu

ceiving the Carlist general and inducing him to believe the attack was to be made here. The manœuvre succeeded, for Mendiri tranquily invited the attack here during the three days which followed, while Moriones, with 20,000 men, was executing his flank movement by way of Sanguesa. It was not, I believe, until the morbing of the 2d, that Mendiri neard of the whereabouts of Moriones, who had by that time reached Monreal. From all I can gather I believe that Mendiri still enterrained hopes of being able to hold Carrascal even with Moriones in its rear, so strong did he consider the position THE LIBERALS CAUTIOUS.

But, as might have been lorescen, the liberal general decimed to attack entrenched positions when there were others not entrenched, whose possession was more advantageous, and on the evening of the same day he sent Primo de Rivera, who commanded the centre, against Oteiza, which place he occupied with scarcely any resistance, because Mendiri had withdrawn nearly every man from here for the expected attack at Carrascal, in which he persistently contuned to believe. Primo de Rivera not only occupied Oteiza, but pushed forward, seized the neights of St. Cristobal, beaning that place, which the Carlists ought to have fortified and beld at any cost, and then descended on the opposite side and seized Lorca, on the road between Puente la Reina and Estelia, and thus

descended on the opposite side and seized Lorca, on the road between Puente la Reina and Estella, and thus

CUT THE CARLIST LINE IN TWO.

All of this occurred on the evening and night of the 2d—the same day that Moriones reached Noain. So far La Serna's pian had succeeded perfectly. Mendrit, who received information of the movement, immediately abandoned Carrascal, hoping to arrive at Otelza in time to stop it. But ne was too late. He did not receive the information in time, and the truth is that he appears to have been badly served throughout by his spies and informants. It was only at six o'clock in the evening that he finally gave the order to abandon Carrascal, and took up his march toward Est-haby way of Puente ia Reina. It was probably with a very heavy heart that he did this. The Carlists had been here so long that they rad made fortifications which they had londy hoped were invulnerable, and it was here that they had expected to meet and vanquisa the enemy. To be obliged to abaddon such fine positions without striking a blow was to despair almost of success, and the murmurs of the soldiers were loud.

However, there was no help for it. Mendiri, scarcely halting at Puente long enough to see Don Carlos, who was there, pushed on through the darkness, in hopes of resening Lorca in time to stop the advance of Primo di Rivera. I believe it was only at Cirangui he received the information that Lorca was in the hands of the liberal troops and the road to Estella barred.

It was a critical moment. The minantry, it is true, could get around Lorca by a mountain pach; but this was not possible for the artillery except the mountain guns.

There was only one course to be adopted—return to Puente ia Reina, thence take the road to Pampeluna to within three miles of that blace, where a road branches off and joins the one from Pampeluna to estella, when passes through Echauri. It appeared almost a hopeless plan. Moriones might easily have reached Pampeluna by this time, and, should he send out a detachment to seize eithe

while the greater part of the ministry passed around Lorca by the mountain bath already spoken of.

ESTELLA.

For besides the danger to the artillery, another, far more serious, toreatened the Carlist army. It was that an attempt should be made upon Estella early in the morning by La Serna, the liberal command of the left, and Primo di Rivera. In concert, with the whole of the liberal army remaining after the departure of Moriones—about 35,000 men—and that it should be taken before the the arrival of the bulk of the army. The troops, there ore, continued the march until a late hour in the might and resumed it before daylight next morning. By noon next day the greater part of the aimy had reached the low hills north of Lorca and taken up positions to stop the further progress of Primo di Rivera in this direction. The artillery had, in the meantime, gone around by Ecnauri, and by daylight next morning was well out of danger on the road to Escella. Little did Moriones dream that the Carlist artiliery was passing so near him and that if he had nistened attentively he might almost have beard its rumble under his window. The Carlist army, cut in two the day before, had aircady united again.

I saw Serrano when he was in Biarritz, and in reply to my question as to whether it had not been his intention to try to break the Carlist line at Lorca and Oteiza he replied, somewhat evasively, that it was useless to cut the Carlist army in two, as it was capable of such rapidity of movement that it would be united again before any advantage could be taken of the circumstance. He spoke with great admiration of the Carlist troops and said there were no better soldiers in the world. His words were certainly propoetic as regards cutting the Carlist army in two, for, as has been seen, it was united again eighteen hours after.

Don Carlos

was at Puente when the operations commenced, and he only retired from there at eleven o'clock at hight with the rear guard of the army, for it had been declosed to abandon Puente as well as Carrascal. He slept at Maneru, and the next morning had a consultation with Mendiri at Ciranqui. He was very much dissatisfied with the turn affairs had taken, and e-pectally at the loss of the heights of St. Cristobal.

furn affairs had taken, and e-pecially at the loss of the heights of St. Cristobal.

I may as well say here that I have not yet been able to get at the truth regarding the loss of the important position, although, as I have already said, the Carlists had not sufficiently fortified it to have entoned them to hold it very long against a superior force.

ON THE HEIGHTS.

Menoiri had left three battallons, or sabout two thousand men here, and these would have been

Against a superior force.

Nendrir had left three battalions, or about two thousand men here, and these would have been amply sufficient to hold the heights until the arrival or reinforcements. Instead of this they were abandoned without scarcely firing a shot. There is talk, as usual in such cases, of treason, and it is one of the reasons that makes one despair of the cause of Don Carlos, that we never the Carlists have a very important position to hold, on which success, victory or the saiety of the army depend, that position, either through negligence, cowardice or treason, is sure to be abandoned at the critical momen. Such was the case at San Marco, where Ochillos ran away after a sure of the whole plan of operations about frum, both was the case at San Marco, where Ochillos ran away after a plan of operations about frum, both was allowed by a surprise, and I bave seen so much negligence on both sides with regard to the placing of outposts and pickets that I think this explanation of the aftair the true one. A general holding the most important point on the whole line, simply allowed it to be surprised without scarcely any resistance. What can be expected of an army commanded by such men? Had the Carlists retained possession of these heights they would have had an excellent line of deience, that from Villamayor, on the Los Arcos road, through Otelza to Ciranqui. As there is a range of mountains excending from Ciranqui north to Irursun, this line could only be turned by one road—that from Pampeluna through Rehauri to Estelia. But into road a very casily defended. Two or three bactow while the could only be turned by one road—that from Pampeluna through Rehauri to Estelia. But into one part of the ground is sure case of the mountain between others, and is very casily defended. Two or or the ground is only about seven miles and as a great part of the ground is very casily defended. Two or or the sone of the ground is only about seven miles and as a g

In the meantime Mendiri, after some hesitation,

The Carlist line extended from Villamayor on the Los Arcos road, through Dicastino, Otelza and sendigorna, to Carrascat or Bingrum on the road, thout sail way between fatalia and Pampeluna, the observal army occupying the positions opposite to Logrono. Sesma, Lerin, Larraga and Talaia.

The Carlist divided to the two villages of Pueyo and Artajona as advance posts of Carrascat.

On the 30th of January the liberal troops advanced and seized these two villages. This movement was made probably with the intention of de-

had reached the plain north of Lorca and Lacar the night before, and been billeted on the different villages—a part of whom had just arrived, were, by Mendira's orders, being concentrated as fast as possible.

But Don Carlos, who could not see the movements which were taking place, grew impatient toward noon, and sent an officer to Mendiri to ask if his orders were being executed. Mendiri replied that he was doing his best, and that he would soon name the hour for the attack. But the afternoon wore on and still the impatient King could see no signs of what was preparing.

At two o'clock he sent another and to Mendiri, when the latter replied that the attack would commence at exacily a quarter to lour.

WAITING FOR THE BATTLE.

Don Carlos now mounted and proceeded to a little hill just behind the Carlist lines and took up his station to waten the approaching conflict. As the hour drew high he once more sent word to Mendiri that he would not allow the approach of night as an excuse for delay. Don Carlos rarely interferes with the plans of his generals, but when he does it is apparently with some effect.

The Scene.

now presented from the summit of the little hill where I stood was full of a tively interest, It was a bright, sunby, warm alternoon, with the bright sky and clear atmosphere which, at this season of the year, are only to be seen in Spain. Away to our right Monte Jurra, the sentinel of Estella, litted its head, ensirouded in that thin binish mist so suggestive of October in America; before us the low, woody mountains between Oteiza Lorca and Caranqui, the eastern point of which is called St. Cristocal, where we could distinguism with our glasses great masses of solders moving about against the say; at our feet the villages of Lorca and Lacar, where the enemy could inkewise be seen almost within gunshot without the aid of a glass; to the left, on the summit of a hill, Don Carlos mounted on a show white steed, with a group of horsemen watching the progress of events; wille to the north, in the direction

to accomplish anything, and it either succeeds it will not be the lault of the officers, but of the solders themselves, and mere chance.

THE BAITLE.

There is a low range of miles that extends around Lacar in a semicircle from the Estelia road to the range of mountains which have come down from the Sierra de Andia, past Salinias de Oro to Ciranqui. On the top of these filis the Carlisis were now concentrating at the distance of about infee-quariers of a mile from the nated village. They were divided into three columns, one forming on the left above Alloz, one on the centre opposite the village, the other of the right, not far from the Estelia Road. One was led by Mendrif in person, one by General Perulia and the third by Colonel Calderon, of the King's Guards. They counted in all about 8,000 men, while the liberals had 6,000 in the two villages of Lacar and Lorca and Bair a battery of arthery, or four guns. The Carlists had likewise four guns, placed two on the left and two on the right. At exactly a quarter to four—bon Carlos told me he noted the time, watch in hand—the bugges sounded the charge, and the three columns sprung up and swept down the vine-covered milisue toward Lacar like an avalanche. At the same moment 400 cavalry started down the road which passes Alloz, Lacar, and strikes the Estelia Road above Lorca. It was a somewhat strange proceeding to send cavalry to charge a village, the streets of which were probably barricaded, but it was probably done for effect.

For a moment no noise was heard but the iron clatter of the horses' feet as they went down the road at a swinging trot. Not until the Carlists were hall way to the village was a single shot fired, and the prisoners say that when they first saw the Carlists coming they thought it was Moriones, who had arrived from Pampelana. Suddenly the Carlist coming they thought it was Moriones, who had arrived from Pampelana. Suddenly the Carlist power of the village that had begun in earnest. The Carlists had feached the noot of the nill without losing

Smoke.

CAPTURING THE CANNON.

The artillery suddenly ceased firing on both sides—the Carlists', because it could not fire without damage to the Carlist troops; the enemy's because

THE CARLISTS HAD CAPTURED IT. THE CARLISTS HAD CAPTURED IT.
They rushed up the little slope, closed around the village, swarmed over the barricades, engaged in a hand-to hand fight in the streets, surrounded the artillery, which never ceased to roar at them, bayoneted the gunners and captured the pieces, Then came up a shout which was heard distinctly above the din and the roar of the condistinctly above the din and the roar of the conflict, and the meaning of which we in the rear only learned later. One piece, however, escaped, although the limber was captured in a rayine behind the village. The gunners had evidently run it down here, and as they could not get it out whole had litted the gun off the carriage—it was a light one—and carried of dragged it up the slope to their lines and so saved it.

But the village was not yet captured.

THE ROLL OF THE RIFLE

was continuous and incessant; the Carlists had now likewise commenced using their kemingtons and the din was terrible. Soon the village and the little hill itself disappeared in the smoke which gathered over the place in the dense white cioud.

the little nill itself disappeared in the smoke which gathered over the place in the dense white cloud.

The fight which ensued must have been terrible. All the houses in these Spanish villages are built of heavy stone walls, two and three feet thick, the doors of heavy oak, against which the butts of guns fly into splinters without phasing them. The windows are small and numerous, scarcely larger than loopholes, many of them being that shape, as if made for defence. For a while the fight raged in the streets, but the Carrists at last cleared them. It was different with the houses and the houses were full. The liberals defended themselves with desperation, and from every window a dozen rifles were incessantly pouring forth a well directed fire on the Carlists in the street below. But nothing daunted they gathered up beams of wood and great stones, and the heavy oaken doors went in with a crash. The Navarrese rushed up to the walls, stooped down while their comrades ian up over their backs, mounted to the windows, seized the guns that were thrust out, scrambled in by twos and threes, went at their loe with those sbort, crooked, ugly knives, with which they are all provided. There was no quarter given in this hand-to-hand fighting, and the prisoners taken in the affair were not taken here.

A NEUTRAL'S SPECIAL SURVEY.

All this time we on the hill benind could see only an occasional flash dart out of the dense cloud of smoke and hear the horrid din of the battle which flied the air. Of those desperate hand-to-hand struggles, in which men go at each other with smothered curses, clenched teeth and garring, bloodshot eyes, we could see nothing.

HE TWO KINGS.

But we saw something else. The fight had scarcely commenced when we observed scampering up the hillside behind Lora a group of norsenen, among whom was one who rode a fine white charger.

WAS IT ALFONSO?

He, it is said, was Don Allonso, who was in Lora when the fight commenced and who note.

men, among whom was one who rode a fine white charger.

WAS IT ALFONSO?

He, it is said, was Don Alionso, who was in Lorca when the fight commenced, and who naturally scampered out of harm's way at the sound of the first shot. The group of horsemen reached the top of the heights and then stopped and turned round to watch the progress of the fight.

THE TWO KINGS
were thus on different hills within two miles of each other, watching the first battle one of them had ever seen. It is very likely Don Alionso may have recognized his relation, who occupied a prominent position on a hill, and Don Carlos told me he had suspected it was his little cousin. If either could only have captured the other it would be the best thing that could have happened to unhappy Spain.

LACAR TAKEN.

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LACAR TAKEN,
In about three-quarters of an hour the Carlists had obtained possession of Lacar; all the liberal troops who were here had either escaped or were among the killed and wounded. In the meantime, although light was last approaching, the time of battle rolled on to Lorca and up the heights beyond it. I do not know whether Mendiri really meant a serious attack on these neights, but suppose he did not, as it was too late in the day to have done so with any hope of success. The distance to be traversed would take an hour's hard marching were no fighting to be done. To have carried the heights in three hours, therefore, would be quick work. But it was quite dark an hour and a half after the light commenced. An attempt against the heights, therefore, at that hour would have been foily, and i suppose Mendiri only meant to chastise the enemy, and let them know his army was not cut in two. But the soldiers, having taken tacar, rusned on to Lorca, and as I have said, far up the beights behind that village.

THEIR OFFICERS WERE UNABLE TO RESTRAIN THEM.

Colonel Caderon, of the King's Guards, who attained hearly to the summit of the heights, told me he had never seen the soldiers in such a humor. They were as merry as if engaged in a

game of ball, and went at the enemy with a goodnatured shout that was not at all in keeping with
the coid steel that followed. But he could do
nothing with them: they would not listen to him
when he tried to hold them back, and he was
obliged, perforce, to go with them. The truth is,
it was the men who led the officers, and not the
officers who led the men.
FIGHTING IN THE DARENESS.

The fight continued until quite eight o'clock,
until it was so dark that nobouy could see where
he was going, and friends could not be distinguished from foes.

BRILLIANCY IN THE MIDST OF BLOOD.

Seen from our standpoint the mountain pre-

the was going, and friends could not be distinguished from foes.

Brilliancy in the midst of blood.

Seen from our standpoint the mountain presented a brilliant spectacle. It was as if covered with thousands and thousands of fireflies darting about through the darkness in every direction; but the heavy continuous roar told only too well whence came those tongues of fame, and a regalarly iccurring flash like an immense ball of firefloid owed by a deep, low grow, showed where the enemy's artillery were at work.

The Carlist betreat.

At length the fire slacknead, the Carlists commenced retiring. For awhile was heard the call of the bugles gathering up the troops, answered by shouts and cries, but soon a projound slicace succeeded to the din and uproar of the conflict. The battle was over.

I remained for some time on the spot from whence I had witnessed it and tried to pierce the deep gloom in the valley below. But all that was to be seen was an occasional flash of light, as though somebody had lighted a match, and all that was to be heard was a moaning voice in the darkness coming one could not tell whence. The industrial should be a subject to the ground overpowered, the wearty to sleep and the wounded to die. As a mounted my horse, who was pawing the ground with impatience, I wondered how many poor lellows were ying down there in the shence and darkness gazing with dead eyes up at the stars, and now many more verroite than death. To die is easy; but one night's sunfering of the wounded on the field of battle were enough one wound think to wipe out the sins of a world.

I went into Lacar next morning. The streets and houses of the village presented a terrifying spectacle. Pools of blood and dead bodies were lying about in every direction, nearly all with Dayonet wounds. The streets were torn up and doors smashed into splinters, while the interior or ome of the nouses was even more northle. The stairways were simplery with blood; in some of them were as many as fifteen or twenty bodies almost floating in a sea o

But it is unnecessary to dwell on these scenes.
They are the same in all these Spanish street and house fights.

But it is innecessary to dweil on these scenes. They are the same in all these Spanish street and house fights.

The Losses.

Altogether the Carlist loss in the fight is now estimated at about 450 in killed and wounded; that of the enemy at 887 in killed alone, winch the Carlist claim to have buried, besides about 200 wounded and 223 prisoners. But the great girry of the day was the capture of the three cannon, they being the first the Carlists nave taken here in the north, although I believe some have been captured in Catalonia. They were steel oreechioading Placencia pattern, callife 8. The news was immediately telegraphed all over the browness, and these cannon alone will be sufficient to persuade the people to believe in a great victory and make amends for the lailure of the slege of Pampelunia.

What was found on the bead.

One curious fact was brought to light in searching the ordies of the dead, and that was the large amount of money found in the pockets of the liberal soldiers. Some had as much as 500 and 1,000 francs, and all had from 59 to 109. The Carlists say they received this money in payment for the pronunciammento in layor of Don Allonso. As soon as this fact became known, as it was early in the fight, the Carlist soldiers robbed every for they come lay their hands upon, dead, wounded or prisoner, and many of them came out of the fight with several hundred francs. The Castidians were, however, the most lucky as they captured the cash box of one of the enemy's battalons that were in Lacar and seized about 50,000 francs. It was father giad of this as these castilians, the best soldiers the Carlists have, are still without uniforms and were, until a short time ago, without batter became known the provinces requising to furnish them because these soldiers are from another province.

nish them because these soldiers are from another province.

ROBBING THE DEAD.

Letters, papers and everything were eagerly seized by the Carlist soldiers, and every day I see groups of them ga hered around some one, who is reading a letter found on the oody of some poor fellow dead in the fight. Many of these are love letters, and some cause bursts of uprogrous mirth, while others entit expressions of sympathy from the listening group.

I was attracted yesterday by hearing a number of them gathered around one who was reading one of these letters. They were all saying, "La pobre?" "La pobre!" with very soft voices. I asked to see the letter, which was bordered with a rude margin of black, and they handed it to me. It was written in a small, awkward, girlish hand, showing the writer was very young, and commenced, "Mi querido Hermano." "My dear brother, it is sieven days since I have heard from you." I folded it up, put it in my pocket, gave the soldier a franc and walked away. Eleven days! Poor little sister!

The RESULTS OF THE VICTORY.

The victory, as regards strategical results, is without importance. The two armies remain in exactly the same position they were before, with the exception that the Carlists hold leacr.

without importance. The two armies remain in exactly the same position they were before, with the exception that the Carlists hold Lacar, which is not of the slightest use to hem. The moral effect of it, however, in both armies has been very great. The Carlists, discouraged by their retreat from Carriscal, have taken heart again; the liberals begin to perceive that Ahonso XII, is not such a man to exorcise the demon of Carlism with as they had supposed, and the operations of the liberal army have been suddenly arested. The truth is it was a very brilliant affair. The Carlist army had been cut in two, the greater part of it cut off from Esteila, its arthiery in the most hazardous position, and yet, eighteen bours

cut in two, the greater part of it the most hazardous position, and yet, eighteen hours after, that army unites, concentrates and, at the very moment when the liberals are announcing a great victory and the capture or all the Carlist artiflery, hulls lisely against the enemy, captures three cannon and takes a bloody revenge for its deteat at Carrascal. It proves what the Carlist solders are capable of going if they had only one general to direct them.

THE POSITIONS.

As I have already explained, the liberal army has obtained possession of Puente ia Reina, Oteiza and the neights between that place and Lorca, the Carlists still holding Ciranqui, the heights about Puente, called Santa Baroara, and that range of mountains extending from Ciranqui south toward the Sierra de Andia. The Carlist line, as it now is, or that part of it from Villatuerta to Alioz and Trure, is not a good one, and they will probably be obliged to fall back to the old line at Adarzuza. This gives the enemy possession of an that country north of the Puente and Estella road, as far as the Sierra de Andia, between Estella and Salinas de Oro, besides endangering the Carlist rear. As I have aiready explained, the line they should have held was that through Oteiza and Villatuerta might now bemoard Estella with very long range guns.

PLANS OF THE LIBERAL GENERALS.

It is, of course, difficult to say what may be the plans of Luserna Moriones, Primo de Rivera or whoever may be the leading spirit in the Alionsist arm, I doubt it they have a plan at all. After raising the siege of Pampeluan they might, with the lorce at his command, have marched into the Vai de Bastan and seized the French fronter. The pass over the Pyrenees oy the only road—that the Pass over the Pyrenees oy the only road—that the

faising the siege of Painfictural they might have done either of two things-Moriones might, with the force at his command, have marched into the Val de Bastan and seized the French fronter. The pass over the Pyrenees by the only road—that to Bayonne—is, of course, a difficult one; but the Carlists had here only about 500 men, and they could not have stopped 10,000 men very long. With this road the Hoerals would have not only the French fronter, but the woole of Navarre except the little corner about Estella.

Now it is Navarre that furnishes all the supplies for the Carlist army at present, and to lose this province would be a severe blow which might result disastrously.

The other plan is the one Moriones should have executed the day after he entered Pampeluna. He might have marched to Irunsun with his whole army, and while the carlists were lighting Frimo oc Rivers at lacar, entered the valley of the Araquil, seized Alsasua, the pass at Salvatierra, the roads from Alsasua to Estella, passing on through a tinnel in the Sierra de Andia, the other through the valley of the Amesevas, which I have described in a previous letter. These roads and passes once in his possession—and the Carlists had scarvely any troops here to detend them—the whole Carlist army would have been cut off from Guipazcoa, and completely surrounded in the small corner of teritory around Estella. They could not have held out here a month, because they would have been cut off from their supplies. It was thought for a time here that this plan would be acopted by Moriones, and many of the Carlist ine being much shorter than it was, they have more troops to spare and have sent a sufficient force to frunsun to note the pass against any force whatever.

But this is only a sample of the way the campaign is conducted on both sides. Both armies commence executing a plan of campaign, and when it is nail accomplished stop, wilt and give the enemy time to invariate it. Both sides will when side will make the official many decided to make the attempt it w

position of that of the Carlists should be continually on the move, incressantly attacking on the right, on the leit, on the centre, everywhere, so that the enemy may never know where to expect it. Instead of this if remained quite inactive, when activity would have been of some use, and took up the offensive when it was too late.

Everything considered I do not find that the Carlist cause is gaining ground, but rather losing, I do not miget the from the simple loss of Carrascal, because, after all, that is of little importance, but from the way the whole business was managed, which shows they have no general, no head. The Carlist cause was at its flood after the oattue of Abarzuza. If Don Carlos had then inglone good general I believe he would ere this nave been in Madrid. Then was the prooftious moment when a lew heavy blows, struck with rapidity and decision, would have completely discouraged and routed his enemies.

It two days after the oattle of Abarzuza Don Carlos had sent 10,000 men to Pampeluna they would

would

HAVE TAKEN THE PLACE BY STORM WITH MASE.
Three days after 5,000 of these same men might have selzed frun, three days later Hernani and a week after St. Sebastien.

At that time there was a panic throughout the whole liberal army, and the troons besides not knowing what government they were fighting for would not have fought at all. These places might all have been taken by storm with case, for the Carlist troops will go wherever they are led.

That the liberal army could not have opposed any resistance to a series of blows thus rapidly struck is snown by the fact that it has taken it eight months to recover from the defeat of Abar-Zuza.

eight months to recover from the defeat of AbarZUZA.

Don Carlos, having shown himself capable of profiting by opportunities, then might have floated a loan, and, considering the state of affairs at Madrid at that time, would probably have been there now. Instead of this, however, he sat down in his trenches and quietly gave the enemy eight months in which to reorganize his shattered forces, repair mis losses and renew the attack with greatly increased chances of success, only attempting in the mean time the stupid siege of frun, after months of work in constructing artiflery roads, when the place might have been taken at any time in an nour with five battailons.

At irlus—The worst mistake of All.

A man who should go hunting partifles with a battery of field guns would not be more absurd than the Carlists at frun. Their reason for not taking all toese places by assault was that it could not be done without a great loss of lite. But people who do not want to break eggs should not attempt to make omelettes, and people who do not want to break eggs should not attempt to make omelettes, and people who do not want to break eggs should not want but give the golden opportunity, and if he wans now it will be only because Don Alionso's generals are more incompetent than his own.

THE CENTENNIAL.

THE GOVERNMENT'S PARTICIPATION IN THE CELEBRATION ASSURED-CONCERTS IN AID OF THE CENTENNIAL-CHINA'S REPRESENTATION. The most important fact to be mentioned just

now in connection with our coming Centenary is the appropriation by Congress of \$505,000. This appropriation, which was one of the few laudable actions of the last Congress, and was passed so near the close of the session, removes the only not been granted, its success might still be dublous, but now that the government has closely identified itself with it, its success seems assured. Efforts had been made in Europe previous to the appropriation to throw discredit upon the undertaking by representing it as a private affair only. had nothing to do. This statement was unfortunately but too true, and people pointed sneeringly at the fact that Japan, Sweden, Canada, Australia and several other countries had already appropriated more money for the Centennial celebration of American independence than the United States had done. This placed the managers of the Centennial in a rather awkward position before European nations. In Europe, of course, the tutelage of government is rendered necessary for everything. and people would turn up their noses at any exposition which was not heralded as a government affair. How important this appropriation was to the managers may be gathered from the fact that General Goshora waited till two o'clock in the morning for the despatch announcing the passage of the appropriation, saying "that he could not have slept without it." And why not? Because he is thoroughly devoted to this great work; because his heart is in its worthy consummation. WHAT THE APPROPRIATION IS FOR.

The original estimate of the departments, it will be remembered, was \$971,000, so that Congress cut it down about one-half. The following were the amounts claimed by the various departments, every one of which will probably be reduced to nearly one-half.—The Interior Department claimed \$211,000; the Treasury Department, \$5,000; the Post Office, \$5,000; Auricultural Bureau, \$60,000; Smithsonian Institute, \$100,000; War Department, \$200,000; Navy Department, \$150,000; incidentals, \$50,000, and for a separate building capable of removal to Washington after the close of the Exhibition, to be then used as a national museum, \$200,000, What the departments will exhibit has already been alluded to in these columns. Of especial interest will, undoubtedly, be the exhibition by the Smithsonian Institute of the natural resources of the Animal, vegetable and minera, king-ioms of the United States, which is even to include live Indians in the full splendor of their native lashions; the specimens of smalf arms, artiflery, &c., from the War Department with an illustration of our fortifications, pontooning, torpedo system, geodetic surveys, civil works, of our manufacture of muskets and ammuniton, of our hospital service, tents, flags, unitorms, harness, the signal gress cut it down about one-halt. The following

service, tents, flags, unicorns, narness, the signal service, and the models of ships, boats, &c., irom the Navy Denartment.

CONCERTS IN AID OF THE CENTENNIAL.

The financial agent in this city stated yesterday that he had recived a proposition from some oliminate to the content of the content in the city to give concerts in all of the concents. The matter is at present in a shape too unchoate to warrant the publication of all the details, Governor Bigler viewed the proposal with layor, more for the aid which its execution might infinish in making the Centennial celeoration the social topic of the day than for the pecuniary assistance it would supply. He said the Centennial soliceration the social topic of the day than for the pecuniary assistance it would supply. He said the Centennial soliceration the social topic of the day than for the pecuniary assistance it would supply. He said the Centennial soliceration the social topic of the day than for the pecuniary assistance it would supply. He said the Centennial soliceration that the content is the other, and if people only thought about it the necessary tunds would soon be forthcoming. The trouble was that the sentiment in New York was still too cold, and a serie of classical concerts might have the effect of diffusing the interest in the country. "Music hat charms" to interest even the least patriotic American in the Centennia.

THE FINANCIAL WORK Is propressed in this cry it would naturally be adopted throughout the country. "Music hat charms" to interest even the least patriotic American in the Centennial number of ismail subscriptions to a small number of large subscriptions. They would rather have, for instance, ten subscriptions of \$150 than one of \$1,000. Why? Because the more people are made part owners the better for the enterorise. Every one of the ten subscriptions would be sure to wist Philadelphia about the strongers would rather have, for instance, the number of prominent cutzens of New Haven who have united as an Advisory Board for that city ar

JOHN MITCHEL'S POSITION.

The British Political Question of the Hour-What is His Citizen Status?

"The Man for Tipperary" Adopted by the People.

How Gladstone Honored the Italian "Felon" Patriot of 1848.

DUBLIN, Feb. 20, 1875. The question of the week in Ireland-we may say of the nour, for at the moment when I write it still continues to engross the largest share of public attention-has been the position of John Mitchel.
THE ELECTION TO PARLIAMENT.

The election for the county of Tipperary tool place on Tuesday. Up to the very last moment there was the most complete uncertainty as to what was going to happen. An address to the electors had appeared from a Mr. Richard Butler, of Surville, near Casnel, who declared his adhesion to the home rule platform. It was freely stated, and, indeed, taken for granted, that the Tory principles would be maintained by Sir W. Osborne, Bart., of Beechwood, near Nenagh. On Sunday, 14th of February, a meeting was neld at Templemore, in North Tipperary, at which P. J. Smyth, the Member for Westmeath, presided, Mitchel was enthusiastically adopted as the "Man for Tipperary." In the course of his speech Mr. Smyth declared that if Butier persevered in oppos ing Mitchel neither he nor any one connected with him should ever represent Tipperary, and "his descendants would be known in future generations as the descendants of the men who opposed John Mitchel." Similar meetings were held elsewhere through the country, and there could be no mistake as to the opinion and desire

was fixed for Tuesday, the 16th, at the Court House in Clonmel, the county town. There, at eleven o'clock in the forenoon, the High Sherid, James Scully, Esq., took his place, and soon after a nomination paper of "John Mitchel, of Clinton

eleven o'clock in the forenoon, the High Sheriff, James Scully, Esq., took his place, and soon aiter a nomination paper of "John Mitchel, of Clinton avenue, Brookiyn," was handed to him, signed by Thomas Cross, of Garracanty, hear the town of Imperary, and John Gorman, of Borrisbeg, hear Templehore, both tenant harmers of the county, No other homination was made during the two hours taat, according to the law regulating elections, the Sheriff remained sithing, and at one o'clock the court was closed. The space of an hour was then allowed to intervene, according to the act of Parliament, and at two o'clock the Sheriff remained sithing, and at one o'clock the court was closed. The space of a Knight of the Shre to represent the county of Tipperary in the Commons' House of Parliament," An Avengreen of History.

What a retrospect the scene would have conjured up to any one acquainted with the fistory of Ireland for the last quarter of a century or more. On the very spot where the Sheriff declared Joan Mitchel to be the elected member for Tipperary sat Canef Justice Blackburne, nearly tweaty-seven years before, pronouncing sentence of death on Smith O'Beren, Meagher, MacManna and O'Dononoe, for laidire in an insurrectionary movement which altenet had done his utmost to promote and then to precipitate. Close by stood young Dilion, son of John Dillon, who was not unknown in New York some twenty years ago, and for whose apprehension a reward of £300 was othered by the government in 1848. Ten years ago the wheel of time had sent John Dillon to Parliment as member for Tipperary, and now it was sending John Mitchel in the same capacity.

THE GOVERNIENT Shows ITS HAND.

Meantime the news was being telegraphed across to London, and the curtain which had so well concealed the literations of the government at once rose. "Metturns" were moved for the same evening in the House of Commons of all papers connected with Minchel's conviction in 1848 and escape from Van Dismeh's Land in 1838. No litis member as a Britiss commissioned

see whith in the old days, so lay once, say thore was much of the old ring in it. He told his hearers that it was work coming all the way from the old it was work coming all the way from the North Pole to receive the honor they conferred upon him their day before by making him their member. One thing they might depend upon, he would never sell them; he would never make terms for his vote with the Minister. He might be expedied from the seat by the government over their in London." But he would come again and again to them, as often as they would have fitth. And if they at last rejected him he would go to any other Irish core from the work of hours, to clonate, the county town, where he was most enchusiastically received, and he again addressed the people. But the strain was too much for nim. Next merining he was very prostrate and weak. His riemas consuited together and it was decided to remove him to Cork until his health would be sufficiently established to enable him to care; out his intention of visiting every town in Tupperary. At present he is saying in complete restrement, as far as the excitang circomistances of the moment perfect. He returned to cork on Turitraday. That might the decade on his status look place in types with have fully more meriting the liouse of Commons, upon the motion of the Prime Minister of England, should have expressly resolved to admit within its raises Dr. Keneary, the new member for his potential, and asso upon the motion of the Prime Minister of England, should have expressly resolved to admit within its raises of complete conceined which have fully more many decided from Mitchell of the prime Minister) to excited blom Mitchell, misment as being a "convicted field in Mitchell of the prime Minister) to excited blom Mitchell mismale as being a "convicted field in Mitchell of the prime work of the prime with the motion of the Prime Minister) to excited from the work o